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Introduction 
The importance of knowledge as a strategic resource that provides firms with competitive 
advantage has been widely acknowledged (e.g. Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992; Inkpen, 2008). As competition becomes increasingly knowledge-based, the 
ability of firms to learn and develop capabilities faster than their rivals is argued to be a source 
of competitive advantage (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Consequently, learning and knowledge 
transfer, both within a firm and between firms, are considered a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. This particularly applies to inter-firm collaborative arrangements, such 
as strategic alliances, which are identified widely as means through which firms access, 
acquire, transfer, share and exploit knowledge resources that are otherwise unavailable within 
the firm (Inkpen, 1998; Grant & Baden-Fuller 2004; Lavie, 2006).  
While inter-firm knowledge transfer is strategically important, the process of transferring 
knowledge is adjudged to be very difficult (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Apart from difficulties 
emanating from the stickiness/tacitness of knowledge (Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999), 
partner firms seeking to acquire or transfer knowledge through their alliances need to possess 
the appropriate characteristics that enable knowledge to be acquired, transferred, shared and 
utilised. For instance, a recipient firm’s motivation to learn, and its cognitive ability to acquire 
knowledge, have been argued to influence the extent of knowledge transfer between the 
recipient and the source firms (Hamel, 1991; Lane & Lutbakin, 1998; Perez-Nordtvedt et al., 
2008). Without appropriate partners’ characteristics, knowledge transfer/acquisition may not 
be achieved. 
Generally, research on inter-firm (and often inter-unit) knowledge transfer has constantly 
emphasized characteristics of knowledge sources and knowledge recipients to be key 
determinants of knowledge transfer (e.g. Minbaeva, 2007; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008; 
Lawson/Potter, 2012; Jasimuddin et al., 2015). These characteristics include ‘motivational 
factors’ such as learning intent and knowledge transfer willingness, as well as ‘cognitive 
factors’ such as absorptive capacity or retentive capacity. However, although the importance 
of both motivational and cognitive characteristics as determinants of knowledge transfer has 
been illustrated in numerous conceptual studies (e.g. Hamel, 1991; Inkpen, 2000; Simonin, 
2004), empirical studies have largely found support for the dominance of cognitive factors (e.g. 
Szulanski, 1996; Minbaeva & Michailova, 2004; Junni & Sarala, 2013). In particular, 
absorptive capacity, which is largely the function of similarity and overlap of the recipient’s 
and source’s knowledge bases, has been found to be a very dominant determinant of knowledge 
transfer. But this dominance is not surprising, as most of these empirical studies are focused 
on knowledge transfer between symmetric partners in advanced industrialised and transitional 
countries, where there are relatively similar levels of knowledge sophistication and 
complementary knowledge transfer motives. Determinants of knowledge transfer in 
asymmetric relationships, such as those between developed-country-based firms and 
developing-country-based firms, where there are often large gap/difference in ‘knowledge and 
resource bases’ as well as in ‘alliance motives’ of the transfer partners have not been 
systematically studied. Local indigenous firms in less developed countries (LDCs) are 
increasingly relying on collaborative arrangements with foreign firms from developed 
countries to access or acquire knowledge and develop their capacities (see, e.g. Osabutey et al., 
2014). There is accordingly a necessity for a systematic inquiry into the determinants of 
learning/knowledge transfer in such type of collaborations in order to aid firms in their alliance 
decisions. 
The few existing studies on knowledge transfer between foreign firms and local firms in 
developing countries are focused mainly on ‘market-entry alliances’, where there are 
complementary motives of transfer of ‘local market knowledge’ and ‘technological/managerial 
knowledge’ between foreign and local partners. In this stream of literature, the possession of 
cognitive characteristics (e.g. absorptive capacity) by the local developing-country-based 
partner firms is also emphasized as a key condition to acquiring knowledge/technology from 
foreign developed-country-based partner firms (e.g. Osabutey et al., 2014; Narteh, 2008). 
However, no studies have been focused on ‘market-exploitation alliances’ where there is 
divergence in alliance motives of the partners due to irrelevance of ‘local market knowledge’ 
as a potential learning motive in the collaborations. While meeting a minimum cognitive 
threshold is a necessary condition for learning, it may not be a sufficient condition for 
knowledge transfer to occur in such asymmetric market-exploitation inter-firm collaborations. 
This paper intends to address this research gap and focuses on inter-firm collaborations 
between foreign and local indigenous companies in the Nigerian oil industry, which are typical 
examples of asymmetric market-exploitation alliances. Using the qualitative case study 
research method, in which four cases of alliances in the industry were studied, the factors that 
facilitate knowledge transfer between foreign and local firms in the collaborations were 
explored. Based on the case study research, this paper analyses the role of the partners’ 
motivational and cognitive characteristics in the transfer of knowledge in the alliances. It shows 
how the extent of knowledge transfer in the asymmetric market-exploitation alliances is 
determined primarily by partners’ motivational factors. These are the degree of ‘learning intent’ 
(LI) of the local partner companies as knowledge recipients, and the degree of the ‘knowledge 
transfer willingness’ (KTW) of the foreign partner companies as the knowledge sources. 
Contrary to extant theory, which suggests ‘knowledge protective’ tendencies of foreign 
partners in response to local partners’ learning intention in alliances, this study shows that 
foreign partners in these alliances were willing to transfer knowledge to the local partners in 
response to their demonstration of learning intent. This paper, therefore, highlights the 
dominant role of motivational factors in knowledge transfer processes of asymmetric market-
exploitation alliances. It also develops a set of propositions to expand understanding of key 
determinants of partner learning and knowledge transfer.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it extends the theory of learning/knowledge 
transfer determinants to a distinctive type of international inter-firm collaborations in a LDC, 
namely “asymmetric market-exploitation alliances’, where the foreign partner firms already 
had their local subsidiaries in the host-country prior to engaging in the collaborations. Second, 
it demystifies the concept of ‘relative absorptive capacity’ for local partner firms in LDCs. It 
practically encourages local firms to take advantage of learning opportunities in their 
collaborations, by enhancing motivational factors that facilitate knowledge transfer, rather than 
being discouraged due to lack of relative absorptive capacity. 
Inter-firm Collaborations in Nigerian Oil Industry 
The Nigerian oil and gas industry has witnessed an increasing trend of inter-firm collaborations 
between foreign oil companies and local oil companies in recent years. This was induced 
indirectly by the Nigerian government’s indigenous participation policies in the industry, 
which awards marginal oilfields to local indigenous oil firms to operate. Faced with the 
challenges of inadequate financial resources and technical capabilities, many of these local 
indigenous oil companies increasingly entered into various kinds of equity and non-equity 
partnerships with international oil companies in the industry, in order to jointly operate their 
acquired oilfields (Heum et al., 2003: p. 30; Hindle/Woldemichael, 2009). These partnerships 
were a purely voluntary strategic option chosen by those local indigenous oil companies, which 
lacked the capabilities to operate their oilfields acquired through the government’s indigenous 
participation policies. The foreign oil companies in the partnerships usually provided the key 
technical capabilities and funds required for the operations, while local partners provided their 
acquired oilfields and other minor capabilities. Apart from ‘risk sharing’ and ‘access to oil and 
gas assets’ by foreign partners as major goals of these partnerships, ‘learning/knowledge 
acquisition’ constituted an important goal in the partnerships, particularly for the local partner 
companies, who hoped to develop their capabilities through the collaborations. However, the 
partnerships were generally characterized by a large gap of technological and managerial 
capabilities between the foreign oil companies and their local partners in the alliances. The 
foreign partners in the alliances usually possessed superior capabilities in terms of cutting-edge 
technology, financial resources and organizational know-how, while the local partners were no 
match for their foreign partners in terms of these capabilities. The local partners were mostly 
locally-based, small and medium-sized, oil companies, while their foreign partner companies 
were mainly large and medium-sized international oil companies from the more developed and 
industrially advanced countries. These often had their local subsidiaries operating in the 
industry prior to their collaborations with local firms. In such asymmetric relationship, it is 
most likely that the foreign partners may perceive little or nothing to learn from their local 
partners, and thereby possess no intent to acquire knowledge from them. Conversely, the local 
partners lacking the requisite knowledge and capabilities may perceive the foreign partners as 
reservoirs of superior knowledge and technologies, and thereby, exhibit explicit learning intent 
to acquire knowledge from their foreign partners. An empirical study of these partnerships is 
therefore very necessary to identify the key factors that facilitate learning/knowledge transfer, 
and provide information that can support firms in making alliance decisions. 
Literature Review 
The literature on inter-firm knowledge transfer has identified a number of different sets of 
factors that determine knowledge transfer (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008). These include: the 
nature and characteristics of knowledge itself (Simonin, 1999; Zander & Kogut, 1995; Inkpen, 
2008); the characteristics of knowledge source and knowledge recipient (Hamel, 1991; 
Szulanski, 1996; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Perez-Nordtvedt et al., 2008; Lawson/Potter, 2012); 
and the nature and characteristics of the relations between source and recipient (Hansen, 1999; 
Bengoa & Kaufmann, 2016). However, for the scope of this paper, this literature review is 
focused on the characteristics of knowledge source and knowledge recipient, which can be 
categorized into motivational and cognitive factors.  
Motivational Factors 
A key motivational factor that has been identified to influence knowledge transfer is recipient’s 
learning intent (LI), which is defined as the deliberate desire and will of a focal firm to acquire 
knowledge from its partner in inter-firm collaboration (Hamel, 1991, p. 90). In other words, it 
is a firm’s motivation to learn from its partner. Various scholars have pointed out that inter-
firm knowledge transfer occurs mainly through deliberate design, rather than by default, and 
therefore, prior intention of a partner firm to learn through the collaboration becomes a key 
determinant of knowledge transfer (e.g. Hamel, 1991; Norman, 2004; Perez-Nordtvedt et al., 
2008; Simonin, 2004). Without a deliberate intention to learn, learning/knowledge transfer 
would be left to chance; that is, it may or may not take place. Without LI, alliance partners are 
less likely to initiate learning mechanisms and commit resources to learning processes in the 
alliances (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). Therefore, the stronger the intention to learn, the higher the 
chances that knowledge transfer will occur and that the focal firm will learn from its partner 
(Inkpen, 2000; Tsang, 2002; Simonin, 2004). 
While the LI of a recipient firm increases the chances of inter-firm knowledge transfer, the 
source’s motivation to transfer knowledge has been identified as an equally important 
determinant factor (Szulanski, 1996; Simonin, 1999; Lawson & Potter, 2012). The source’s 
motivation to transfer knowledge has been conceptualised under different terms in the 
literature. For instance, Szulanski (1996) identified ‘lack of motivation of the source’ as a key 
barrier to knowledge transfer. He argued that this is often reflected by the source’s reluctance 
to share crucial knowledge for fear of losing ownership of the knowledge, or for lack of 
adequate rewards for sharing its hard-won knowledge. Simonin (1999) identified ‘partner 
protectiveness’, which reflects the extent to which knowledge sources protect their knowledge 
and competencies through deliberate policies and procedures that restrict the sharing of 
relevant skills and know-how with their partners. Partner knowledge protectiveness is argued 
to influence the degree of knowledge transfer between knowledge sources and recipients 
(Norman, 2004; Lawson & Potter, 2012).  
Moreover, with regard to the source’s motivation to transfer knowledge, Husted and 
Michailova (2002) argue that knowledge transfer often depends on the ‘willingness’ of the 
knowledge source to signal the possession of knowledge and share it with others, while 
Lubatkin et al., (2001) suggest that the knowledge transfer willingness of a knowledge sender 
may be shored up by the sender’s perception of reciprocity from a knowledge recipient.  
Although various terms have been used to discuss the concept of source’s motivation, there is 
consensus that motivation of a knowledge source to transfer knowledge is a key factor that 
determines the extent of knowledge transfer.  
Cognitive Factors 
The cognitive factor cited most often as influencing knowledge transfer is the recipient firm’s 
ability to learn and acquire knowledge, which is argued to be determined by its ‘absorptive 
capacity’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Szulanski, 1996). Absorptive capacity is defined as ‘a 
firm’s ability to recognize the value of new external knowledge, assimilate it, and apply it to 
commercial ends’ (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, p. 128). At the inter-firm level of analysis, various 
authors have emphasized specific similarities and overlap between the source and recipient as 
the determinant of absorptive capacity to acquire knowledge (e.g. Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Lane 
& Salk & Lyles, 2001; Mowery et al., 1996). Lane and Lubatkin (1998) introduced the notion 
of ‘relative absorptive capacity’ and argue that the ability of a recipient firm to learn from, or 
with, a source firm is jointly determined by the relative characteristics of the two firms, i.e. the 
similarity of both firms’ basic knowledge-bases, their organizational structures and their 
dominant logics. It is suggested that, without understanding the basic assumptions underlying 
each other’s knowledge-base and/or possessing similar operating structures and compactible 
norms and values, a recipient firm can hardly evaluate, acquire and assimilate the sender’s 
specialized knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998, pp. 464-465).  
The concept of recipient’s absorptive capacity has been discussed in different fields, often 
under various conceptual labels, such as ‘receptivity’ (Hamel, 1991) and ‘retentive capacity’ 
(Szulanski, 1996). However, all of these emphasize the importance of similarity and overlap of 
the source’s and recipient’s knowledge bases. The general consensus implies that the 
absorptive capacity of a knowledge recipient is a key determinant of knowledge transfer 
process and that the greater the absorptive capacity, the greater the degree of knowledge 
transfer (Szulanski, 1996; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001; Minbaeva, 2007; Awang et al, 2013).  
Dominance of Cognitive Factors 
Both motivational and cognitive factors have been the subject of conceptual and empirical 
studies. While some of these studies focus on a single factor such as absorptive capacity (e.g. 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001; Park, 2011), others focus on multiple 
determinant factors and their relationship to knowledge transfer (e.g. Szulanski, 1996; 
Simonin, 2004; Minbaeva, 2007; Van Wijk et al., 2008). However, although the importance of 
both motivational and cognitive factors as determinants of knowledge transfer has been 
illustrated in the conceptual studies, the results of empirical studies have largely found support 
for the dominance of cognitive factors (e.g. Szulanski, 1996; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Lane, 
Salk & Lyles, 2001; Minbaeva & Michailova, 2004). In particular, absorptive capacity has been 
found to be a very dominant determinant of knowledge transfer. Interestingly, most empirical 
studies examining and analysing multiple determinants of knowledge transfer often emphasize 
the weaker influence of motivational factors on knowledge transfer, in contrast to cognitive 
factors. For instance, in his study of inter-unit transfer of best-practices, Szulanski (1996) found 
that cognitive-related barriers such as ‘lack of absorptive capacity’ dominated the motivation-
related barriers in the process of knowledge transfer, and therefore, argued for the devotion of 
more resources and managerial attention to reducing cognitive-related barriers.  
Also, empirical studies focusing on a single determinant, particularly on absorptive capacity, 
have found a strong positive influence on the degree of knowledge transfer (Lane & Lubatkin, 
1998; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001; Park, 2011; Junni & Sarala, 2013). Lane & Lubatkin (1998) 
found that the ability of partner firms in research & development (R&D) alliances to learn and 
transfer knowledge to one another depended on the relative similarity in their knowledge bases, 
organizational structures, compensation policies and dominant logics, which they termed 
‘relative absorptive capacity’. Similarly, Lane, Salk & Lyles (2001) found that the relative 
absorptive capacity of the international joint ventures (IJVs) in Hungary influenced their ability 
to understand and acquire new knowledge held by their foreign parents.  
The strong emphasis on cognitive characteristics, particularly absorptive capacity, may be 
attributed to the fact that most of these empirical studies are focused on knowledge transfer 
between symmetrical transfer partners in advanced developed and transitional countries, where 
there is generally a considerable level of similarity in the resource bases and organisational 
processes of the transfer partners. For instance, some of these studies focused on inter-unit 
knowledge transfer within a multinational corporation (e.g. Szulanski, 1996). Other studies 
focused on knowledge transfer between IJVs and their parent firms (e.g. Lane, Salk & Lyles, 
2001) or between partners in inter-firm alliances involving firms in developed countries (e.g. 
Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). These are cases of symmetrical relationship, where knowledge 
transfer partners have relatively similar levels of knowledge sophistication and resource base, 
thus making the issue of similarity and overlap of knowledge-bases prominently relevant for 
knowledge transfer. However, in knowledge transfer between foreign developed-country firms 
and their local partners in a LDC like Nigeria, where there is a large gap in knowledge and 
capabilities possessed by the partners, comparable similarity/overlap between the partners may 
be lacking. This gives rise to the question as to what factors determine knowledge transfer in 
such relationships. Although the importance of partners’ cognitive characteristics for 
knowledge transfer process may be undisputed, it is necessary to move away from the emphasis 
on similarity/overlap or thorough understanding of partners’ knowledge-bases to the 
consideration of partner-firm’s specific resources and levers that enable the firm to 
acquire/transfer knowledge from/to its partners (Simonin, 2004). In this way, the real factors 
facilitating the capacity of the individual partner firms to acquire/transfer knowledge from/to 
its alliance partner could be easily assessed, particularly in an asymmetric inter-firm knowledge 
transfer context, where the issue of similarity/overlap may not arise. This context of inter-firm 
collaborations is the focus of the case study analysis in this paper. 
Knowledge Transfer in International Inter-Firm Collaborations in Developing Countries 
International inter-firm alliances in developing countries, particularly those involving at least 
a foreign firm from a developed-country and a local firm from a LDC, have been widely 
acknowledged to be characterised by asymmetries between foreign and local partners (see e.g. 
Beamish, 1988; Dacin et al., 1997). ‘Partner asymmetry’ as used here refers to dissimilar 
attributes of partner firms in alliances that are very relevant to the alliance processes, including 
the process of learning and knowledge transfer. Partner firms in international alliances could 
be asymmetric in internal resources such as size, equity, technologies, knowledge or 
capabilities brought to their alliances, which could influence alliance processes (Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997). Partner asymmetry could also be manifested in their collaborative goals 
(Hamel, 1991). LDCs are characterized by a lower level of economic, technological and 
infrastructural development, which also reflect on LDC-based local firms. Unlike inter-firm 
collaborations in advanced industrialized or transitional countries, international alliances in 
LDCs are usually characterized by asymmetries between the foreign and local partnering firms. 
These are not only in terms of company size and cultural differences, but also in technologies, 
knowledge and capabilities brought into the alliances by the partner firms, as well as in their 
motives of alliance. 
When extending the debate on learning/knowledge transfer to international alliances in 
developing countries, the few existing studies often argue that foreign partner firms in such 
international alliances usually possess the learning intent to acquire “local market knowledge” 
contributed to the alliance by the local partner firms, while the local partner firms often seek to 
appropriate the superior “technological and managerial knowledge” brought to the alliances by 
the foreign partners (e.g. Inkpen & Beamish 1997; Hitt et al., 2000; Kale & Anand, 2006; 
Osabutey et al., 2014). Hence, the learning intents of the partners often lead to competitive 
learning races, in which the partner firm with greater learning intent and absorptive capacity 
wins and dominates the collaborative relationship. Once the foreign partner acquires the ‘local 
market knowledge’, the rationale for the collaboration would have been eliminated, unless the 
local partner is contributing other valuable knowledge and skills to the collaborative 
arrangement (Kale & Anand, 2006; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Therefore, possession of strong 
absorptive capacity by the local partner firms has also been emphasized as a key condition to 
acquiring knowledge/technology from foreign partner firms (e.g. Osabutey et al., 2014; Narteh, 
2008). 
Generally, while the importance of ‘local market knowledge’ to foreign firms engaging in 
international alliances is undisputed, the contribution of such knowledge by local partners to 
the alliances may be redundant and less important in cases where foreign partners already 
possessed local market knowledge of the host-country prior to their alliances with the local 
firms. Makino and Delios (1996) suggested other channels, apart from local partners, through 
which ‘local market knowledge’ could be made available in international inter-firm 
collaborations. In such cases, it is difficult to assume that ‘local market knowledge’ would 
constitute the learning intent/target of the foreign partner firms in the alliances.  
The problem with the argument in the literature is that the few existing studies have been 
focused mainly on ‘market-entry alliances’, where there are complementary knowledge 
transfer motives between foreign and local partners to exchange ‘local market knowledge’ and 
‘technological/managerial knowledge’. No studies are focused on ‘market-exploitation 
alliances’ in developing countries1, where foreign partner firms already possessed ‘local 
market knowledge’ of the host-country through their subsidiaries before their collaborations 
with the local firms, and therefore, may have different alliance motives from their local 
partners’ learning/knowledge acquisition motives. Little, or nothing, is known about the 
determinants of learning and knowledge transfer in such type of asymmetric alliances with 
divergent motives between the partners. This type of asymmetric international alliances is very 
prevalent in the Nigerian oil industry and provides the context upon which the case study 
research/analysis in this paper is based. 
The Case Study Research & Analysis 
The aim of the study was to examine the learning activities of the partner firms in selected 
cases of inter-firm collaborations between foreign and indigenous firms in the Nigerian oil 
industry, and thereby, identify key factors that facilitated learning/knowledge transfer between 
partner firms in the alliances. For this purpose, the study focused on: the concepts of ‘learning 
                                                          
1 Through market exploitation alliance strategies, foreign companies often engage in inter-firm collaborative 
arrangements with local firms in the host-countries through their own local subsidiaries in order to exploit 
market opportunities and transfer firm-specific advantages (see e.g. Scott-Kennel & Enderwick, 2004).  
intent’ (LI), ‘knowledge transfer willingness’ (KTW), ‘knowledge protectiveness’ (KP) and 
‘learning capacity’ (LC) of the partner firms. These were seen as the most widely cited firm-
based characteristics that represent motivational and cognitive determinants of knowledge 
transfer. The definition of LI in this study follows the definition by most authors, which sees 
LI as the propensity to view alliance relationship as a learning opportunity (Hamel, 1991; 
Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Inkpen, 2000). The degree of a partner firm’s LI in an alliance is 
reflected by the level of articulation of learning agenda by its top management; the level of 
commitment to the learning agenda in the collaborative arrangement (Simonin, 2004; Tsang, 
2002); and the level of communication of the learning agenda to the employees at various levels 
within the partner firm (Pucik, 1988). The degree of a partner firm’s KTW is reflected by the 
level of articulation and implementation of support systems (e.g. training of recipient’s 
personnel) that help the recipient partner to acquire knowledge/skills from the source partner 
(Szulanski, 1996). Conversely, KP is reflected by intentional policies and procedures put in 
place by a partner firm to restrict access to, and sharing of, relevant information concerning its 
technology and processes (Simonin, 1999; Simonin, 2004). 
LC refers to the ability of a partner firm to learn/acquire knowledge from its partner in inter-
firm collaborative arrangement. LC, as used here, is closely related to the concept of 
“absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), but differs slightly in definition and 
operation. The definition of LC in this study follows Simonin’s (2004) definition, which 
emphasizes firm-level characteristics deployed by partner firms to learn/acquire knowledge 
through their alliances. Unlike the concept of “absorptive capacity”, which emphasizes the 
relative characteristics, i.e. specific similarities/ overlap between partner firms that facilitate 
learning (see Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Lane et al, 2001; Mowery et al, 1996; etc.), LC focuses 
on partner firm’s specific resources, assets or levers that enable the partner firm to learn/acquire 
knowledge from another partner firm in the collaborative arrangement. This definition of LC 
facilitates easy assessment of the individual partner firms’ ability to acquire knowledge in 
asymmetric alliance contexts, where there is a large gap between partner firms’ resource and 
knowledge bases. Components of LC include: human and material resources that facilitate 
learning in the alliance (see Pucik, 1988; Inkpen, 2002); explicit institutional routines, systems 
and measures that induce commitment to learning from other partners in the alliances (Pucik, 
1988; Lane/Lubatkin, 1998); and general attitudes and beliefs prevalent in a partner firm that 
favour learning through the alliance (Hamel, 1991). The presence of these three components 
demonstrates the capacity of the focal firm to acquire knowledge in the alliance. 
Methodology 
Although much appears to have been written about inter-firm learning and knowledge transfer 
in general, the nature of learning and knowledge transfer in asymmetric international alliances 
in the Nigerian oil industry has not been studied. Therefore, the effort to study the 
learning/knowledge transfer activities in these alliances was exploratory in nature, and was 
designed to extend, rather than test, alliance learning theory. Consequently, a qualitative case-
study research approach was deemed appropriate (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). Four cases of international inter-firm collaborations in the Nigerian oil industry were 
selected for the study (see table 1 below). The cases were selected according to the logic of 
literal and theoretical replication (Yin, 2009) but subject to the constraint of research access. 
All foreign partners in the study were international companies based in Western Europe and 
North America but differ in size and industry positions. All foreign partners had their local 
subsidiaries in the industry prior to engaging in the focal alliances, or in the case of D, had 
executed projects in the industry before the focal alliance.   
The data collection for the study was carried out between October 2008 and February 2010. It 
comprised of mainly semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted with the representatives 
of the partner companies in the selected cases of alliances, and archival data collected from the 
partner companies and the government regulatory agency in the sector. A total of 27 interviews 
were conducted in all the partner companies, comprising three representatives (a top manager, 
a middle manager and an employee) in each of the local partner firms and three representatives 
(an alliance manager and two other employees) in each of the foreign partner firms. 27 
informants are above the number needed to reach theoretical saturation (see Bengoa & 
Kaufmann, 2016). The interview sessions lasted in the average of between 60 and 90 minutes 
and were recorded with a voice recorder.  
The data from the interview responses were combined with information obtained from archival 
data to enrich the findings as this is a case study research. Archival data were obtained from: 
(1) partner companies’ annual reports, profile brochures and newsletters reflecting information 
on their partnerships/collaborative arrangements, (2) government regulatory agency’s industry-
review reports highlighting issues of foreign-indigenous partnerships in the industry that 
involved the partner companies in our selected cases, and (3) fieldtrip/observation notes in 
Nigeria and Europe. This data base was further enriched with information from other secondary 
sources such as various industry-focused news articles from local and foreign newspapers 
publishing information regarding the selected cases of alliances. 
The process of analysing the data followed steps recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles 
& Huberman (1994). The first step was presenting and organizing the data (i.e. data reduction 
and data display). All interviews recorded in the voice recorder were transcribed to create 
interview-transcripts. The data from the interview transcripts were combined with information 
from the archival data and other secondary sources to create a raw data base. This was followed 
by “coding”, which is a process of condensing qualitative data into analysable units (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). In the process of coding, relevant statements or clauses were systematically 
searched for in the raw data and assigned to the listed descriptive codes and to the sub-codes 
that were developed along the process. The entire process of data analysis was aided by the 
data-analysis-software called “ATLAS.ti” (version 6) 
 Findings 
The Four Cases of Alliances 
An overview of the four cases of alliances, and the knowledge transfer activities of the partner 
firms in the alliances, is shown in Table 1 below. Cases A, B, and D were non-equity alliances, 
in which the foreign and local partners agreed to jointly develop and operate the oil fields 
owned by the local partners. In the case of D, the partners jointly bid for, and execute, oilfield 
services projects for clients in the industry, and share profits after cost recovery. However, case 
C was an equity alliance, in which the foreign partner owns 40 percent equity in the oil field 
originally owned by the local partner firm. Nevertheless, the practical alliance process was 
similar in all of the four cases: the foreign partner provides financial assistance and key 
technical capabilities for the operation, while the local partner provides its oil assets and other 
minor capabilities. None of the four cases of alliance had a separate third entity (in the form of 
a joint venture) jointly owned by the partners. However, each of the four cases had a formal 
alliance interface, through which the partner firms meet to take decisions regarding the 
operations of their collaborative arrangements. This interface was called “joint-operating-
team” in cases B and C, and “joint-technical-team” in case A.  In case D, there was a “joint-
project-team”.  The interface was comprised of a team of key personnel (including top and 
middle managers) from the foreign and local partners, who met regularly to take operational 
decisions. Employees of the foreign and local partners in each of the four cases also worked 
together on the fields. 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of the cases and findings 
 
 
 Learning Intent 
None of the foreign partners in the four cases of alliance possessed any intent to learn through 
the alliance or to acquire knowledge from their local partners. However, the interviewed 
managers in the foreign partner firms acknowledged that the collaborative arrangements 
Local partner (s) Foreign Partner (s)
                              Case A
● Non-equity, joint operation partnership
● Operates in the exploration & production sub-
sector of Nigerian oil industry
● A two-partner alliance (a foreign firm and a local 
firm)
● Foreign partner was a medium-sized MNE based 
in Europe 
● Foreign partner had a local subsidiary in Nigeria 
prior to the alliance
● Possessed comparably low degree of learning 
intent and learning capacity
● Learning intent was limited to a merely 
declaration of intention by the top management
● No logistical resources, mechanisms or 
incentive system deployed to facilitate 
knowledge acquisition
● Recognized the need to learn through the 
alliance, but doubted foreign partner's 
readiness to transfer knowledge
● Possessed no learning intent and  
no cognitive interest to learn
● Believed it has nothing to learn 
from its local partner
● Demonstrated no willingness to 
transfer knowledge or support local 
partner's learning efforts 
                             Case B
● Non-equity, joint operation partnership
● Operates in the exploration & production sub-
sector of the industry
● A three-partner alliance (two local firms and a 
foreign firm)
● Foreign partner was a medium-sized MNE based 
in North America
● Foreign partner had a local subsidiary in Nigeria 
prior to the alliance
● Possessed comparably low degree of learning 
intent and learning capacity
● Learning intent was limited to a merely 
declaration of intention by the top management
● No logistical resources, mechansims or 
incentive system deployed to facilitate 
knowledge acquisition
● Recognized the need to learn through the 
alliance, but doubted foreign partner's 
readiness to transfer knowledge
● Possessed no learning intent and  
no cognitive interest to learn
● Believed it has nothing to learn 
from its local partner
● Demonstrated no willingness to 
transfer knowledge or support local 
partner's learning efforts 
                           Case C
● Equity partnership based on joint operation 
agreement
● But without a separate third entity jointly owned 
by the partners
● Operates in the exploration and production sub-
sector of the industry
● A two-partner alliance (a foreign firm and a local 
firm)
● Foreign partner was a large MNE based in Europe
● Foreign partner had a local subsidiary in Nigeria 
prior to the alliance
● Possessed considerably high degree of 
learning intent and learning capacity
● Learning intent comprised clearly defined and 
communicated learning objectives
● Deployed resources, mechanisms and 
incentive systems to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition from foreign partner 
● Believed it can learn valuable skills from its 
foreign partner
● Possessed no learning intent and  
no cognitive interest to learn
● Believed it has nothing to learn 
from its local partner
● Demonstrated clear knowledge-
transfer-willingness and deployed 
resources to support local partner's 
learning efforts
                           Case D
• Non-equity, joint project alliance
● Provides oilfield engineering services in the 
industry
● A two-partner alliance (a foreign firm and a local 
firm)
● Foreign partner is a large MNE based in North 
America
● Foreign partner had no local subsidiary but had 
executed projects in Nigeria prior to alliance
● Possessed considerably high degree of 
learning intent and learning capacity
● Learning intent comprised clearly defined and 
communicated learning objectives
● Deployed resources, mechanisms and 
incentive systems to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition from foreign partner 
● Believed it can learn valuable skills from its 
foreign partner
● Possessed no learning intent and 
no cognitive interest to learn
● Believed that its local partner 
needs to learn and upgrade
● Demonstrated clear knowledge-
transfer-willingness and deployed 
resources to support local partner's 
learning efforts
Learning & Knowledge Transfer ActivitiesCases of Alliance
(including alliance structure and attributes)
offered learning opportunity for any partner intending to learn through the alliances. Contrary 
to the arguments in the literature that foreign partners in developing-developed countries inter-
firm collaborations often seek to acquire ‘local market knowledge’ from local partners, the 
managers and employees of the foreign partners interviewed were unanimous in their responses 
that their companies had no need to acquire knowledge from their local partners or through the 
alliances. This is because the “knowledge of the local business environment” that would have 
been sought, or acquired, from their local partners was already available to them through the 
presence of their local subsidiaries in the industry. The major motive of the foreign partners in 
cases A, B, and C was to gain access to the oilfields of their local partners, and jointly exploit 
these oil assets with their local partners for profits. In case D, the major interest of the foreign 
partner was to be able to jointly bid for, and execute, oilfield services contracts with its local 
partner in order to fulfil the government-imposed requirements for the specific percentage of 
“local content” in all oilfield services in the Nigerian oil industry. This major interest of the 
foreign partner in case D is clearly reflected in one of the company’s annual reports. 
In contrast to the foreign partners, the local partners across the four cases possessed intent to 
learn/acquire knowledge from their foreign partners through the alliances. However, the level 
of learning intent by the local partners in the alliances varied across the cases. While local 
partners in cases C and D demonstrated a considerably high degree of learning intent in their 
respective alliances, the local partners in cases A and B demonstrated a comparably very low 
level of learning intent in their alliances. For instance, in case C, the local partner’s learning 
intent was clearly reflected by a written “declaration of alliance objectives” by the top 
management of the firm. This highlighted, among other things, the importance of learning and 
skills development through the alliance and the desire to access, and acquire, technical 
expertise in the area of deepwater offshore oil and gas operations. The learning objective was 
also frequently communicated in the firm through a periodic evaluation of the activities of 
individual employees sent to the alliance interfaces, based on their weekly reports, which the 
employees were obliged to submit on a regular basis. Similarly, the local partner in case D 
possessed a written “general statement of alliance objectives” which included learning and 
career development objectives for its collaborative arrangements with foreign firms in the 
industry. On the basis of the “statement of objectives”, the managers regularly set learning 
targets for the employees sent to work on ‘joint-projects’, and/or to participate in ‘joint-
training-programmes’ with the foreign partner. The employees working in the ‘joint-project’ 
and/or participating in ‘joint-training programmes’ were appraised regarding progress in skill 
development. However, in contrast to cases C and D, the learning intent of the local partners 
in cases A and B was reflected by a mere declaration of learning intentions by their top 
managements, which were neither articulated, nor communicated, throughout the firms. There 
were no clearly defined learning objectives available to their employees sent to the alliance 
interfaces, and no deliberate actions were taken to implement the learning intention declared 
by the management. 
Knowledge Transfer Willingness and Knowledge Protectiveness 
Although foreign partners in all the cases possessed no intent to learn, the foreign partners in 
cases C and D, which were large multinational oil and gas operators in the industry, 
demonstrated clear willingness to facilitate knowledge transfer to their local partners in their 
respective alliances. The foreign partners deliberately deployed measures and resources that 
supported learning and knowledge acquisition efforts of their local partners in the alliances. 
For instance, in case C, the foreign partner created and maintained project-based “internet-
website” and an “intranet facility” for the partnership, where key technical information and 
expertise, as well as reports regarding the operations of the partnership, could be regularly 
accessed by members of both local and foreign partner companies. Questions & answers 
regarding technical difficulties on the field could also be posted for sharing between its 
employees and employees of the local partners. Moreover, the foreign partner supported the 
development of a personnel transfer process known as “secondment programme” in the 
partnership, through which employees of the local partner were regularly attached to the offices 
and facilities of the foreign partner in various locations in Nigeria, and abroad, for specified 
periods of time. This enabled the employees of the local partner to work and learn on the job 
with the state-of-the-art facilities of the foreign partner. And in its capacity as the technical 
advisor of the partnership, the foreign partner often organized and carried out various 
operation-based professional trainings and workshops for the employees of the local partner. 
Similarly, the foreign partner in case D, which was a major oil and gas engineering services 
company in the global oil industry, deployed some financial resources and physical assets, in 
the form of engineering hardware and design software, to support the upgrading of the local 
partner’s engineering facilities in Nigeria at the inception of the alliance. Also, the foreign 
partner deployed some of its engineering personnel to the local partner’s office as part of the 
alliance agreement to facilitate knowledge transfer to the employees of the local partner 
through on-the-job-training and mentoring.  
The foreign partner also facilitated the development of a “secondment programme” through 
which some local partner’s employees were often attached to foreign partner’s offices and 
facilities abroad to work and gain international project experience. However, the justifications 
for this clear demonstration of knowledge-transfer-willingness by the foreign partners differed 
slightly in the two cases. The foreign partner in case C emphasized its desire to support the 
growth and development of local indigenous firms in the industry, which was a major policy 
thrust of the Nigerian government in the industry. But the foreign partner in case D referred to 
its business strategy of maintaining its widely known high quality standards in the “joint-
projects” executed with the local partner firm in the industry as the main rationale behind the 
knowledge-transfer-willingness in the alliance. Nevertheless, the foreign partners also adopted 
a few cautious measures that limited the extent of knowledge transfer to the indigenous partners 
through the alliances.  
In contrast to cases C and D, foreign partners in cases A and B demonstrated no willingness to 
transfer knowledge or to deliberately facilitate the learning efforts of their local partners in the 
alliances. The interviewed managers of the foreign partners in both cases insisted that the 
purpose of the partnerships was purely commercial rather than learning, and therefore, the issue 
of transferring knowledge to local partners does not arise. A manager of the foreign partner in 
case A specifically stated that the local partner “….have not informed us of their interest in 
learning or technology transfer…” 
Learning Capacity  
Consequent upon the lack of learning intent among the foreign partners, none of the foreign 
partners across the four cases made cognitive effort to deliberately acquire knowledge through 
the alliances, although as multinational enterprises they possessed the capability to do so. No 
resources, assets or mechanisms were deployed by the foreign partners to facilitate their 
knowledge acquisition through the alliances specifically. The general attitude and belief 
prevalent in the foreign partner firms across the cases were that they had little, or nothing, to 
learn from their local partners. This was also emphasized in various interview-responses of the 
managers of the foreign partner firms. 
However, the different degrees of learning intent among the local partners across the cases also 
led to different degrees of learning capacity by the local partners in the alliances. While the 
local partners in cases C and D deployed considerable amount of resources to acquire 
knowledge through their respective alliances, the local partners in cases A and B made little or 
no learning efforts  to acquire such knowledge. For instance, the local partner in case C 
provided physical and logistical resources that facilitated learning by its personnel at the 
alliance interfaces. All employees of the company sent to the alliance interfaces were trained 
and equipped with series of current engineering and drilling software applications used in the 
exploration and production of oil and gas prior to their assignments. This enhanced the 
capacities of the employees to work with modern equipment and easily learn new processes of 
oil exploration and production at the alliance interfaces. Moreover, with the support of its 
foreign partner, the local partner utilized the mechanism of “secondments” as an important 
interface to acquire knowledge from the foreign partner and ensured that “seconded” 
employees shared their acquired competencies with other employees in the company upon 
return. The company created a reward system in the form of “project allowances” and other 
“extra bonuses” paid to the employees sent on secondment programmes. These employees were 
appraised on a weekly basis through both compulsory weekly reports sent-in by the employees 
themselves, and assessment reports by the manager in-charge at the foreign partner’s facility, 
to which the employees were attached.  
The learning capacity demonstrated by the local partner in case C was similar to that of the 
local partner in case D. The latter invested heavily in engineering design hardware and software 
to improve the standard of its engineering labs, and provided up-to-date engineering design 
software-application training for its staff prior to their engagement in ‘joint-projects’ of the 
partnership in order to adequately equip them for learning and competence development 
through the partnership. Moreover, the local partner utilized the mechanisms of “formal 
trainings” (in the form of seminars and workshops provided in cooperation with the foreign 
partner) and “on-the-job trainings” (in the form of mentoring, and secondments, to foreign 
partner’s facilities abroad) to facilitate knowledge acquisition from its foreign partner in the 
collaboration. The employees sent to work on joint-projects or to participate in training 
programmes with the foreign partner were provided with learning targets set by the company’s 
engineering department, and the performances of these employees were evaluated and 
reviewed based on these targets. No special reward system was created specifically for 
employees on the ‘joint-projects’, but all employees, whether on “joint-projects” or the firm’s 
solely owned projects, generally received monetary bonuses based on the “man-hour” spent in 
projects. Nevertheless, opportunities to participate in training courses and workshops abroad, 
or to be “seconded” to the facilities of the foreign partner abroad, were highly valued by the 
employees, and were utilized by the company as incentive mechanisms.  
In contrast to the local partners in cases C and D, the local partners in cases A and B made only 
limited efforts to acquire knowledge from the foreign partners in their respective alliances. For 
instance, the local partners in both cases ensured that key staff, including managers, represented 
the companies at the alliance interfaces, and that qualified employees (e.g. geologists, 
petroleum engineers) were sent to the joint work-teams of the alliances. However, no physical 
and logistical resources (in terms of defined learning targets or learning mechanisms such as 
secondment programmes, joint formal trainings with foreign partners, etc.) were specifically 
deployed by the local firms in the two cases to facilitate knowledge acquisition from their 
foreign partners in the collaborations. Moreover, no special incentive mechanisms existed in 
the local partner firms to encourage learning by the employees at the alliance interfaces. This 
lack of considerable efforts by local partners in cases A and B to acquire knowledge from their 
foreign partners could be partly attributed to the lack of willingness of the foreign partners to 
facilitate knowledge transfer to the local partners. The following quote from the interview 
responses of a local firm’s managers portrays the frustrations of the local firms about their 
foreign partners’ lack of willingness:  
“[……] even if I signed a contract that they (foreign partner) provide me technical expertise and I found out that 
look, if I’m going to continue waiting for the expertise, I won’t get what I’m looking for; then I’ll provide mine 
and quickly do it. That’s basically how it is” (Case-B, Engineer, QU: 2:46). 
In all the local partner firms across the four cases, there was a general sense of an urgent need 
to learn, and acquire knowledge/skills, through the alliances. However, the attitudes towards 
learning from their foreign partners in the alliances varied among the local firms. While the 
local firms in cases C and D perceived their foreign partners as a reservoir of superior 
capabilities and believed they could learn valuable skills from their foreign partners, the local 
firms in cases A and B doubted the readiness of their foreign partners to engage in learning 
with them and transfer knowledge through the alliances. The attitudes and beliefs of the local 
partners were echoed in the interview-responses by both employees and managers in the firms. 
Discussion and Propositions 
Against the backdrop of the argument that foreign partners in international inter-firm 
collaborations often possess learning intent to acquire ‘local market knowledge’ from their 
local partners through their alliances, the research reported in this paper focused on studying 
the learning motivations, and capacities, of partner firms in asymmetric alliances in the 
Nigerian oil industry, particularly those alliances that can be described as “market-
exploitation” alliances, where the foreign partners already had local subsidiaries prior to the 
alliances. The findings show that the nature of partner firms’ ‘motivational characteristics’ (e.g. 
learning intent, transfer willingness) and ‘learning capacity’, as well as their influence on 
learning/knowledge transfer, are different from those in other contexts of inter-firm 
collaborations. The strong emphasis often laid on cognitive characteristics as the dominant 
determinant of knowledge transfer, in the general literature, may not fully apply in this context 
of asymmetric inter-firm collaborations. Based on the findings from the case study, theoretical 
propositions are developed focusing on the relationships between partner firms’ motivational 
characteristics, learning capacity, and the degree of knowledge acquisition in asymmetric inter-
firm collaborations. Figure 1 outlines the theoretical model illustrating these propositions. 
 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Model 
 
Learning intent as a motivational characteristic has been shown in this study to be a key driver 
of learning and knowledge transfer activities between foreign and local partner firms in the 
alliances. At first glance, this could be argued to be in tandem with the findings from some 
previous studies in the wider literature (e.g. Simonin, 2004; Lawson & Potter, 2012). The local 
partners which went into the collaborative arrangements with learning intent are the ones who 
made learning efforts, and eventually acquired knowledge through their alliances, unlike their 
foreign partners who had no intent to learn from their local partners. However, contrary to 
findings from previous studies, the findings of this study show a distinction between “indicated 
learning intent” and “formalised learning intent”. “Indicated learning intent” involves mere 
declaration of alliance learning intentions by top management without further articulation and 
communication to employees. “Formalised learning intent” involves declaration of a firm’s 
learning objectives by the top management of the firm with clear articulation and 
communication to the employees that translate the objectives into actions that capture external 
knowledge. All local partners in this study possessed “indicated learning intent”; and this could 
be attributed to the asymmetry in resources/capabilities between foreign and local firms; local 
firms are the disadvantaged partners seeking to improve their capabilities through the 
collaborative arrangements. However, the local partners in cases C and D went beyond the 
“indicated learning intent” to formalise their learning intentions through conscious articulation 
into collectively adhered-to learning objectives at all levels of the firms. Pucik (1988: p. 82) 
argued that non-communication of a firm’s strategic intent throughout the firm often prevents 
top management’s alliance objectives from translating into effective behaviours needed to 
achieve the objectives.  
The findings from this study show that it is only those local partners, who possessed 
“formalised learning intent” that made serious learning efforts, and eventually, acquired 
knowledge through their collaborations. While the existing theory of knowledge transfer 
recognises learning intent as a key determinant of knowledge transfer, the results of this study 
indicate the need to differentiate between “indicated learning intent” and “formalised learning 
intent” at least for the context of asymmetric international alliances in the Nigerian oil industry. 
‘Indicated learning intent’ is likely to be possessed by local firms entering into collaborative 
arrangements with foreign developed-country firms due to the general perception that foreign 
developed-country firms are more resource-endowed partners. ‘Formalised learning intent’ is 
demonstrated only by those local firms making concrete efforts to translate their alliance 
learning intentions into actionable learning objectives/targets. Although “indicated learning 
intent” may be a prerequisite for formalised learning intent, it can be argued that “formalised 
learning intent” represents the primary active step of a local partner in an asymmetric alliance 
to engage in learning/knowledge acquisition in its alliance, without which the local partner is 
less likely to commit resources to learning/knowledge acquisition through the alliance. Thus, 
first two propositions can be postulated as follows: 
P1: Local partner firms in asymmetric inter-firm alliances are more likely to have a 
stronger ‘indicated learning intent’ than the foreign partner firms. 
P2: Local partner’s ‘formalised learning intent’ will positively influence knowledge 
acquisition and transfer in asymmetric inter-firm alliances 
The above argument raises a question as to what propels the movement of a local partner’s 
learning intention from the level of ‘indicated learning intent’ to the level of ‘formalised 
learning intent’. A likely answer to this question can be derived from the findings of this study, 
which indicate that the reputation, and attractiveness, of the foreign partners as reservoirs of 
valuable knowledge and capabilities may have influenced the demonstration of ‘formalised 
learning intent’ by the local partners. As the collaborative arrangements were implemented, the 
local partners became better acquainted with their foreign partners and had better perception 
of the value of their resources/capabilities. This consequently led to increased/active 
motivation to learn from the foreign partner (i.e. ‘formalised learning intent’), where the value 
of foreign partner’s resources was positively perceived by the local partner. This argument is 
supported by Pérez-Nordtvedt et al.’s (2008) study, which found that perceived reputation of 
innovativeness, and superior performances over time, enhances the attractiveness of a firm as 
a source of knowledge to the recipient firm. This attractiveness again boosts the motivation of 
the knowledge recipient to engage in knowledge acquisition from the source. The authors 
argued that source attractiveness is, therefore, a function of the perceived value of knowledge 
possessed by the source, and its reputation of successful exploitation, which then impact on the 
recipient’s motivation to learn from the source. The local partners in cases C and D of the case 
study research in this paper perceived their foreign partners as reservoirs of superior 
capabilities and believed that they could learn valuable skills from them. The foreign partners 
in cases C and D were large multinational enterprises, with the reputation of industry leadership 
in specialized areas of oil industry operations. The attractiveness of the foreign partners in cases 
C and D as sources of valuable knowledge may have impacted positively on their local 
partners’ motivation to learn through the alliances, thereby leading to the demonstration of 
‘formalised learning intent’. The following quote from one of the interview responses gives an 
indication of the perceptions of the foreign partner’s reputation by the local partner: 
“[…..] Training and support from ‘PLUTO’ (i.e. foreign partner firm) will ensure that ‘SIGMA’ (local partner 
firm) can deliver work to PLUTO’s qualities, which is regarded as one of the best EPC company globally” (Case-
D, Manager (Op) of local partner firm, QU: 2:24)    
In contrast to cases C and D, the local partners in cases A and B were not very enthusiastic 
about the reputation of their foreign partners in terms of the value of their 
knowledge/capabilities and achievements. The foreign partners in cases A and B were medium-
sized international enterprises without the reputation of industry leadership (see table 1 above). 
The following statement from interview response of one of the managers of the local partner 
in Case A reveals how the local partner perceived the foreign partner in the alliance. 
 “[….] somebody knows that he has money, he knows that it is not his business. It is like okay, let me get Nigerians 
and I bring my money, so we jointly run this thing for Nigerians. [….] If you are talking about somebody you 
can say he really has technical expertise [….] It is only large services companies that have such; like 
SLUMBERGER, HALLIBURTON, etc.; companies like that can really say they have technical expertise they can 
offer.” (Case A, Engineer of local partner firm, QU: 2:32) 
Although the foreign partners in cases A and B may have possessed sophisticated knowledge 
and skills in the alliances, the local partners’ perception of the foreign partners as a less 
attractive source of valuable knowledge may have contributed to the lack of development of 
their learning intent beyond mere articulation at top management. Thus, a third proposition can 
be stated as: 
P3: Foreign partner’s attractiveness as a knowledge source in asymmetric alliance will 
positively influence the ‘formalised learning intent’ of the local partner as knowledge 
recipient. 
Based on the findings of this case study, it could be argued that ‘formalised learning intent’ is 
a key driver of partners’ learning capacity in asymmetric alliances. This study shows that the 
local partners, in cases C and D, which possessed ‘formalised learning intent’, also deployed 
various mechanisms that enhanced their learning capacity and eventually led to the acquisition 
of knowledge from their foreign partners. This is contrary to cases A and B, where the local 
partners did not move beyond their ‘indicated learning intent’, and consequently, were unable 
to commit sufficient resources, and deploy adequate mechanisms, that would have enhanced 
their capacity to acquire knowledge through the alliances. Therefore, while it can be argued 
that the learning capacity of the local firms in cases C and D eventually facilitated knowledge 
acquisition from their foreign partners, it is evident from the case study results that without 
‘formalised learning intent’, the local partners may not have deployed mechanisms that 
enhanced their capacities to acquire knowledge through their alliances. This finding is 
consistent with the results of other empirical studies in the general literature (e.g. Simonin, 
2004), which found positive influence of learning intent on learning capacity. The local 
partners that possessed ‘formalised learning intent’, also deployed sufficient resources and 
mechanisms that enhanced their learning capacity in their alliances. Therefore, the fourth and 
fifth propositions can be stated as follow: 
P4: Local partner’s ‘formalised learning intent’ will positively influence its learning 
capacity in the alliance. 
P5: Local partner’s learning capacity will positively influence the degree of knowledge 
transfer/acquisition in the alliance. 
The lack of learning intent among the foreign partners in the alliances can be primarily 
attributed to the different motives of foreign and local partners in the alliances caused by 
partner asymmetry. The foreign partners possessing superior technical capabilities and 
knowledge of local business environment believed that they had nothing really to learn from 
the local partners. They, therefore, focused purely on commercial alliance motive rather than 
on learning motive. However, some of the foreign partners in the case study demonstrated clear 
willingness to support the learning activities of their local partners and facilitate knowledge 
transfer to them. This is a key highlight of the research findings in this paper that indicates the 
distinctiveness of inter-partner learning in the asymmetric ‘market-exploitation’ alliances in 
Nigerian oil industry. Previous studies in the general literature suggest ‘knowledge protective’ 
tendencies of foreign partners, in response to local partner’s learning intent in alliances (e.g. 
Lawson/Potter, 2012; Simonin, 2004; Norman, 2004), or a need for local partners’ reciprocity 
in order to shore up transfer willingness of foreign partner (Lubatkin et al, 2001). However, the 
study in this paper shows that foreign partners in two of the four alliances examined were 
willing to transfer knowledge to the local partners, in response to the local partners’ 
demonstration of formalised learning intent. It can be argued that this ‘knowledge transfer 
willingness’ of the foreign partners in cases C and D boosted the capacity of the local partners 
to acquire knowledge in the alliances. For instance, the knowledge transfer willingness of the 
foreign partner in case D led to its support of the ‘secondment programme’ used by the local 
partner to learn and acquire knowledge from the foreign partner. Moreover, the foreign 
partner’s willingness in case C led to, for instance, its provision of an online platform for 
knowledge sharing between the partner firms. Without knowledge transfer willingness of the 
foreign partners, the local partners may have found it very difficult to utilise the right 
mechanisms that would boost their capacities to acquire knowledge from their foreign partners. 
Moreover, without ‘formalised learning intent’ of the local partners, foreign partners may not 
have understood the seriousness/urgency of the local partners’ intent/need to learn from them. 
This is evident in cases A and B, where the local partner lacked ‘formalised learning intent’ 
and their foreign partners demonstrated no knowledge transfer willingness, and consequently 
the local partners were unable to muster sufficient capacity to acquire knowledge through the 
alliance. This finding highlights the important role of sender’s motivation for knowledge 
transfer in asymmetric market-exploitation alliances. Thus: 
P6: Local partner’s ‘formalised learning intent’ will positively influence foreign 
partner’s knowledge transfer willingness 
P7: The knowledge transfer willingness of a foreign partner firm as the knowledge 
source in an asymmetric alliance will positively affect the learning capacity of the local 
partner firm in the alliance. 
 
Although the foreign partners in the alliances imposed few knowledge protective restrictions, 
these were limited to measures that merely controlled the extent of knowledge transfer, rather 
than measures that prevented knowledge transfer to local partners.  This lack of comprehensive 
protection measures by foreign partners can be attributed to the nature of ‘asymmetric market-
exploitation alliances’, where there are both, asymmetry in capabilities, and divergence in 
alliance motives, of the partners. The foreign partners may have considered their local partners 
as no rivals due to the gap in capabilities coupled with the consequent distinctive alliance 
motives, and therefore, seen no serious concerns.  
Conclusion and Implications 
Both the general literature on knowledge transfer and the literature on knowledge transfer in 
international alliances in developing countries, often emphasize the dominant role of partners’ 
cognitive characteristics (such as their ‘absorptive capacity’) as a determinant of knowledge 
transfer. Consequently, they imply that without similarity/overlap of partners’ knowledge 
bases, systems and dominant logics, knowledge transfer is less likely to occur. However, this 
empirical case study research conducted within the context of international ‘market-
exploitation’ alliances in the Nigerian oil industry reveals that partners’ motivational 
characteristics, rather than their cognitive characteristics, were the dominant determinants of 
knowledge transfer within the asymmetric partnerships.  
The findings show that the ‘formalised learning intent’ of the local partner firms and the 
‘knowledge transfer willingness’ of their foreign partners were central in facilitating 
knowledge acquisition by the local partners. Although ‘learning capacity’ as a cognitive 
characteristic played an important role in the learning/knowledge transfer process, it is obvious 
that without ‘formalised learning intent’ of the local partners and ‘knowledge transfer 
willingness’ of the foreign partners, the capacity of the local partners to learn/acquire 
knowledge from their foreign partners would be severely limited, particularly in the face of the 
large gap in partners’ capabilities/organisational systems. These findings have both policy and 
research implications.  
In terms of policy on the facilitation of inter-partner learning in LDCs, the study carries two 
main implications. First, it underscores the importance of a serious consideration of learning 
motive by local partners, early, at the stage of alliance partner search, negotiations and 
selection. It is evident that the choice of a foreign partner affects ‘learning intent’ of local 
partners, and consequently, influences ‘knowledge transfer willingness’ of the foreign partner. 
The local partners should ensure that they collaborate with those foreign partners that are both 
able, and willing, to facilitate knowledge acquisition through the alliance. However, as these 
local firms are often small-scale businesses and internationally less exposed, there is need for 
institutional support by the Nigerian government in this process. The government can support 
in two ways by: (a) appointing a partnership promoting agency that facilitates contacts and 
negotiations between local and foreign firms, and (b) using tax incentives to encourage foreign 
firms to engage in knowledge transfer with local partner firms. Although the Nigerian 
government has welcomed the trend of voluntary foreign-indigenous alliances in the oil 
industry2, and hoped that they would lead to knowledge/technology transfer to local indigenous 
firms (Ihua, 2010; Atsegbua, 2005), this study shows that emergence of these alliances is 
insufficient for knowledge/technology transfer to occur. There is a need to encourage the 
foreign partner firms to engage in knowledge transfer to their local partners.  
Second, this study underscores the importance of clear demonstration of learning intentions by 
local firms in these alliances. It is evident from the study, that, as far as a large gap in 
                                                          
2 Although instigation of alliances between foreign and local firms in the Nigerian oil industry was not the aim 
of the government regulatory frameworks such as “indigenous participation” and “local content” policies, 
Nigerian government welcomed the increasing trend of alliances induced indirectly by compliance to these 
policies as a positive development. 
capabilities (and consequently differences in alliance motives) exists between foreign and local 
partners, the foreign partner may not perceive the local firm’s learning intent as a threat. 
Therefore, this study encourages local firms in LDCs to endeavour to take advantage of 
learning opportunities in their collaborations with foreign developed country-based firms. This 
can be achieved by utilizing motivational factors that facilitate knowledge transfer, rather than 
being discouraged due to the absence, or lower level, of ‘relative absorptive capacity’, in terms 
of similarity/overlap with their foreign partners. 
In terms of research implications, the findings underscore the need for consideration of the 
distinctiveness of “asymmetric market-exploitation” alliances in theorising about determinants 
of learning/knowledge transfer in the literature. While the theoretical propositions in this paper 
are not generalizable, it offers insights that can be tested quantitatively in future research. 
However, it is important to acknowledge possible limitations to the study reported in this paper.  
Firstly, the Nigerian context, within which the study was conducted, is characterised by both 
pervasive corruption, and significant government involvement in the oil industry. These factors 
may have influenced events which were not acknowledged by the respondents in the study. 
Secondly, the study covers only a subset of collaborative learning arrangements, i.e. those that 
do not create a separate entity such as a Joint Venture (JV). It remains to be seen whether or 
not, and how, more formal structures such JVs may affect motivation and resource commitment 
of the partners differently. 
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